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The search for a Cameroonian model of democracy or the search for the 
domination of the state party
996 and 6 were two milestones in the political history of Cameroon. They repre-
sent, respectively, the establishment of a one-party system in the country and the parlia-
ment’s passing of bill that created an independent body to organize country’s elections. 
The road followed by Cameroon, when compared to those of most African countries, no-
tably Niger and Benin, seems to be diferent in regards to what political framework was 
chosen. Analyzing discourse from Cameroonian newspapers in comparison with similar 
events in Benin and Niger, the article shows that since 1966 the country’s rulers have la-
boured to create a ‘Cameroonian exception’ to its method of governance, with the eventual 
aim of having a Cameroonian model of democracy. In reality, the hidden aim has been to 
perpetuate the domination of the state party in the political landscape of the country.
Keywords: Cameroon, Benin, Niger, Cameroonian model of democracy, state 
party, multiparty system 
A procura de um modelo de democracia camaronês ou a procura da 
dominação do partido-Estado
966 e 6 constituem dois marcos da história política dos Camarões. Representam, 
respectivamente, o estabelecimento de um sistema de partido único e a passagem no par-
lamento de um projeto de lei que criou o órgão independente para organizar as eleições do 
país. O caminho seguido pelos Camarões, em termos das escolhas dos igurinos políticos, 
apresenta diferenças relativamente a muitos países africanos, nomeadamente o Níger e o 
Benim. Analisando os discursos dos jornais camaroneses e comparando-os com discursos 
similares no Benim e no Níger, este artigo demonstra que desde 966 os governantes dos 
Camarões têm criado uma situação de “excepção” no seu método de governação, com o 
eventual objetivo de criar um modelo de democracia camaronês. Na realidade, o objetivo 
oculto tem sido o de perpetuar a dominação do partido-Estado no cenário político deste 
país.
Palavras-chave: Camarões, Benim, Níger, modelo de democracia camaronês, 
partido-Estado, sistema multipartidário 
Recebido  de Novembro de  Aceite para publicação 4 de Maio de 
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Since the 1960s, when most African countries got their independence from 
the colonial masters, there has been, in Africa, a search for democratic solutions. 
Here and there, many paths were opened, although in general, new African lead-
ers embarked on a path which has been called “African democracy”. Cameroon, 
being an African country, also embarked on a path which seemed to be peculiar. 
That peculiarity of Cameroon emerged during the 1990s when Africa was swept 
by what Samuel Huntington called democracy s third wave . In order to beter 
appraise what seems to be the Cameroonian exception, the analysis of this case 
should be carried out in comparison with those of Benin and Niger. This study is 
not the irst as far as democracy in Cameroon is concerned nor is it the irst com-
parative study on democracy and democratization in Africa. Victor Julius Ngoh 
 is a paceseter in this respect. Studying the case of Cameroon, he arrived 
at the conclusion that Africans are responsible for the failure or the success of the 
democratisation process in their countries. Whereas he studied Cameroon from 
1960 to 2000, this paper will extend this chronology to 2006 while taking 1966 
as a starting point when the one-party system was established in the country. 
In 2006, the parliament voted a law laying the foundations for the creation of an 
independent electoral body known as Elections Cameroon (ELECAM). Eboussi-
Boulaga (1997) who studied the process of democratisation in Cameroon in the 
s, analysed the various structures put in place and identiied various short-
comings. Zacharie Ngniman (1993) presented the main events of the democra-
tisation process which Cameroon went through as from 1989. This journalistic 
account looked at the real implications of the decisions taken at one moment or 
another in framing the Cameroonian path to democracy. All these studies have 
a weak point which resides in the absence of comparisons with other countries 
which enable a beter understanding of Cameroonian case. This shortcoming is 
avoided by Mario Azevedo who put Gabon and Cameroon side by side in an 
efort to show how ethnicity inluenced democracy in both countries. In com-
parative studies, Mamoudou Gazibo (2000, 2002, 2005) made a considerable con-
tribution as he has studied the trajectories followed by Benin and Niger in the 
democratisation process. Moreover, he called on researchers in the ield of politi-
cal science which allows other disciplines such as history to pay atention to some 
shortcomings in the comparative methodology. He states for instance that, in a 
transnational comparison, the researcher is generally more familiar with one case 
than the other (Gazibo, 2002, p. 441). Moreover, he may have assembled more 
data for one case than for the other. As a consequence, he might be tempted to 
bridge the deicit of familiarity or of data by allowing himself to be guided by the 
case for which he has a beter grounding. There is a danger therefore of arriving 
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at conclusions on the more ‘distant’ case by the observations drawn from the case 
the author is most familiar with. The author of this paper is more familiar with 
the case of Cameroon for which he has gathered suicient data. In order not to be 
caught in the trap of the shortcoming presented by Gazibo, the comparison will 
be limited to speciic aspects which Cameroon on the one hand and ”enin and 
Niger on the other shared notably in terms of the paths taken with regard to the 
creation of new institutions. The comparison will primarily focus on the period 
ater  during which these countries engaged in processes of democratisation. 
This paper aims to show that, throughout, the democracy Cameroon has been 
trying to build since independence has been a search for the domination of the ‘’. 
So, in order to beter present the point, the discussion will begin with the notion 
of democracy, and thereater, the study will present the irst phase of the search 
for a Cameroonian model of democracy. In comparison with what happened in 
Benin and Niger, this search resulted in the institution of a ‘one-party democracy’ 
which, in Cameroon, was the ‘ruling democracy’. The second phase of the search 
presents the ‘advanced democracy’ in which the ruling party’s intention is to pre-
vail by all possible means. 
Africa and the universality of democracy
In a famous interview, former French President, Jacques Chirac, had this to 
say: “democracy is luxury for Africa1  Ouatara, . “lthough that was a po-
litical declaration, the opinion expressed by Mr Chirac fueled the controversy 
on the universality of democracy. In principle, democracy is a universal value, 
but its characteristics are not universal since the interpretation of the concept is 
not universal. It is in this framework that one can talk of American democracy, 
African democracy, Cameroonian democracy. This author does not mean that 
democracy is a stranger to Africa in general and to Cameroon in particular. On 
the contrary, democracy existed in traditional Africa as one former Premier of 
West Cameroon, Augustine Ngom Jua, asserted in 1967 (Ngoh, 2001, p. 9). He 
expressed himself as follows: “the concept of total democracy has its roots in the 
Cameroonian traditional culture where government has for centuries been the 
concern of all the people, by all the people and for all the people.” In this light, 
when Carlos Lopes talks of “the africanisation of democracy” he does not mean 
that there is no democracy in “frica. Rather he airms that “fricans should ap-
propriate the debate on democracy since there is nothing speciically “frican 
in the politics of Africa” (Lopes, 1996, p. 142). The argument is also supported 
1 My translation. 
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by Robert-Charles Dimi (1999) when he discusses the conversion to democracy, 
that is, abandoning the monolithic policy that Africa adopted for decades and 
collided with the principles of democracy. These authors made a point of calling 
upon “fricans who had expressed a diferent concept of democracy. That is why 
democracy has come to be prefaced. Nasser talked of “party-less democracy” 
(Wanyande, 2000, p. 110). It is in this line of prefacing democracy that a path was 
searched for in Cameroon, with some peculiar stages.
The irst phase of the search for the Cameroonian model of 
democracy or the building of the ‘ruling democracy’
The irst phase of the search for a Cameroonian model of democracy began 
with independence. Ahmadou Ahidjo was the main architect of the scheme, and 
had a hidden agenda which was to establish the one party system in Cameroon. 
That system was the foundation of his so called ‘ruling democracy’ that Paul Biya 
reinforced from 1983 onwards.
The political system in Cameroon before independence and reuniication
It is an overstatement to talk of a Cameroonian political system before inde-
pendence, since Cameroon was under colonial rule. What we had was the politi-
cal system put in place by the colonial masters. Cameroon had the French and 
the ”ritish as colonial masters. Their political systems difer in some aspects, but 
in general, ater the Second World War, they were characterised by the existence 
of multiparty politics. 
Multiparty politics in Cameroon under French rule
During the last decades of French rule, Cameroonians started taking an ac-
tive part in the running of their afairs as from  with the institution of the 
Assemblée représentative du Cameroun (ARCAM . The later was the result of the im-
plementation of the French 1946 constitution which created the French Union. 
Two years later, the truly Cameroonian political party was created, the Union 
des Populations du Cameroun (UPC . It resulted from several changes that afected 
the Jeunesse Camerounaise Française (Jeucafra) and the Rassemblement Camerounais 
(RACAM) (Joseph, 1986, pp.102-105). From 1938, when the Jeucafra was founded, 
to 1948, when the UPC came into being, no more than one political party efective-
ly existed in French Cameroon. Multiparty politics was actually initiated in 1951 
when Dr Louis Paul Aujoulat founded the Bloc Démocratique Camerounais (BDC). 
As the Assemblée territoriale du Cameroun (ATCAM) or the Cameroon Territorial 
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Assembly started functioning in 1952, many other political parties came into ex-
istence. They all participated in the political life of Cameroon before 1960, vy-
ing for seats either in the French assemblies or in the local assembly. In 1957, 
autonomy was granted to Cameroon under French rule. That is why a Cabinet 
was put in place with all the members drawn from the legislative assembly that 
was elected in 1957. The members of that assembly were the same who voted 
a motion in  calling for the liting of the trusteeship and the atainment of 
independence on January 1, 1960 (Bouopda, 2006, p. 108). The process that was 
started in Cameroon under French rule was similar to the broader dynamics that 
occurred in French colonial “frica  in ”enin and Niger, ater World War II, mul-
tiparty politics was also introduced with the formation of many political par-
ties. That was the case till 1960, the year of independence in most French African 
colonies. A look at Cameroon under British rule shows a similar picture as far 
multiparty politics is concerned.
Multiparty politics in Cameroon under British rule
Multiparty politics started in the Southern part of Cameroon under British 
rule in 1953. This was a result of a representation crisis that shook the Eastern 
House of Assembly.
This part of British Cameroon was at the time called Southern Cameroon. 
According to the Mandate Agreement and the Trusteeship Agreement, Cameroon 
was to be administered as an integral part of Nigeria. Therefore, Southern 
Cameroon was administered from Lagos in accordance with the laws that gov-
erned the administration of Nigeria. Southern Cameroon started to have a rep-
resentative in the Legislative Council in Lagos in 1942, and Chief John Manga 
Williams was appointed as the representative of Southern Cameroon on that 
council2 (Ngoh, 1990, pp. 22-23; Ebune, 1992, p. 126). As from 1947, when the 
Richards’ constitution became operational, Southern Cameroon had two repre-
sentatives not in Lagos but in the Eastern House of Assembly as provided by 
the constitution. The number changed into 13 with the Macpherson Constitution 
that was promulgated into law in 1951. The new constitution allocated 13 seats 
to Southern Cameroon in the Eastern House of Assembly. It is in that framework 
that the 13 representatives of Southern Cameroon were elected. In 1953, a crisis 
broke out in the Eastern House of Assembly of Nigeria, which gave way to the 
creation of local political parties.
In a nutshell, the crisis stemmed from the leadership clash that shook the 
National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons (NCNC) (Ngoh 1990, pp. 95-103; 
2 A typing error has made Ngoh to talk of 1924 instead of 1942. See Ngoh, 1990, p. 23.
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Ebune, 1992, pp. 138-141). The president of the party, Nnamdi Azikiwe, was 
challenged by his deputy, Iyo-Ita. The later, who was the party s leader in the 
Eastern House of Assembly, opposed Azikiwe’s desire to change the constitu-
tion of the party and to reshule the NCNC cabinet in order to meet the new de-
mands of the Macpherson constitution. As a consequence, disagreements arose 
between the members of the party on the question of ministerial posts in the 
Eastern and Central houses. As Azikiwe wanted to secure the neutrality of the 
13 representatives of Southern Cameroon, he made a statement supporting the 
desire of Southern Cameroonians for a separate region. Later, the declaration 
happened to be a deceitful one as Solomon Tandeng Muna, who held a ministe-
rial post in the Eastern region, was dismissed. The 13 members, who, in 1952, 
had declared their support for the NCNC on the grounds that it identiied itself 
with the cause of Southern Cameroon, were divided as four of them contin-
ued supporting the president of the party. During the May ,  siting of the 
Regional Legislature, the nine other representatives walked out, thus paralysing 
the Assembly’s proceedings. The result was the dissolution of the House and the 
convening of fresh elections which the nine representatives decided to boycot. 
“ter the dissolution of the House, the nine representatives returned to Southern 
Cameroon which they toured while explaining the latest developments to their 
electorate. Subsequently, they organised a conference which took place in Mamfe 
on May 22-25, 1953, and produced a petition requesting the creation of a separate 
autonomous legislature for Southern Cameroon. It is at this conference that po-
litical associations started merging to form political parties. Thus, the crisis in the 
Eastern House of Assembly was an incentive to the creation of political parties 
in Southern Cameroon. The maiden political party was the Kamerun National 
Congress (KNC), which was a merger of the Cameroons National Federation 
(CNF) chaired by Dr Endeley and the Kamerun United National Congress (KUNC) 
headed by Dibonge.
The KNC was oicially launched in June  with Endeley, leader of the former 
CNF, as the president and Dibonge, president of the former KUNC, as patron. The 
Secretary General of the KUNC, Mbile, did not adhere to the new party since he 
had serious diferences with Endeley. The diferences were such that Mbile split 
from the benevolent Bloc formed by some representatives of Southern Cameroon 
in the Eastern House of Assembly whilst the 1953 crisis was unfolding; therefore, 
he could not join the KNC. As Mbile also needed a political party for his own 
ambitions, ater the formation of the KNC he gathered his followers and teamed 
up with P.M. Kale to form the Kamerun People’s Party (KPP), the second political 
party of Southern Cameroon (Ngoh, 1990, p. 105). The creation of this political 
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party introduced multiparty politics in Southern Cameroon, as political difer-
ences led to the split of existing and the creation of new political parties. By 1961, 
when the plebiscite for reuniication was held, Southern Cameroon had many 
political parties amongst which the most important were, besides those men-
tioned above: the One Kamerun (OK), the Kamerun National Democratic Party 
(KNDP) and the Cameroons Peoples’ National Convention (CPNC). These political 
parties competed for seats and positions as Southern Cameroon was granted a 
quasi-regional status in 1954 and a regional status in 1959. In the process, alterna-
tion occurred until reuniication changed the political scene.
The liquidation of the multiparty politics as a means of achieving ‘ruling 
democracy’
The end of the multiparty politics was led by Ahmadou Ahidjo who mas-
terminded the whole process in accordance with a hidden agenda that clearly 
emerges here. According to the political bureau of the Cameroon National Union 
(CNU), in the course of his political career, Ahmadou Ahidjo never hesitated to 
destroy what he had patiently put in place when the general interest was at stake 
(Bureau politique de l’UNC, 1968, p. 14). It is in this spirit that, in 1956, he dis-
solved the regional association he himself headed, i.e. the Association Amicale de 
la Bénoué, to form the Evolution politique du Nord Cameroun by means of which he 
regrouped parliamentarians of Northern Cameroon. That proved to be a prelude 
to the creation of a political party for Northern Cameroon. In 1957, Ahmadou 
Ahidjo was elected to the Legislative Assembly, and became a member of the 
irst French Cameroon Cabinet of May  occupying the post of Minister of 
Interior. He was one of the key actors of the cabinet crisis that led to the collapse 
of the Mbida Cabinet, only to become the new Premier. Being Prime Minister 
without a political party base, Ahidjo understood that he had no backing and 
urgently needed one. He had observed that, in Northern Cameroon, each region 
had a major regional association; thus, if these associations could be grouped 
under one umbrella, a political party, Northern Cameroon would have a stronger 
voice, and he, the Premier, would enjoy a stronger power base. He embarked on 
the task of convincing leaders of regional associations. The task was not an easy 
one as resistance was raised in some quarters. He inally succeeded in convinc-
ing them. As a result, in April 1958, they all assembled in Garoua and the result 
was the creation of the political party, the Union Camerounaise (UC) (Bayart, 1978, 
p. 52), which provided Ahidjo with a new instrument at his disposal in order to 
achieve his goals.
In assuming the premiership, he learnt, from the various parliamentary ses-
sions, that his oice was precarious in the parliamentary system that operated 
93DAVID MOKAMcadernos de estudos africanos  •  janeiro-junho de   •  , -
in Cameroon since the advent of the autonomy regime. In October 1959, the 
parliament voted the law granting full powers to the Premier. So, when French 
Cameroon acceded to independence in 1960, the Premier enjoyed full powers 
without a parliament, given that the ALCAM was dissolved before independence. 
Ahidjo used the full powers he enjoyed to mastermind the constitutional referen-
dum of February 21, 1960 which changed the political system of Cameroon from 
a parliamentary to a semi-presidential one. The new constitution established in 
article  that the irst President would be elected by an Electoral College com-
prising parliamentarians and notables (Gaillard, 1994, p. 111; Bouopda, 2006, p. 
140); in the end the Electoral College was restricted to parliamentarians. The par-
liamentary elections which took place in April 1960 were gerrymandered and 
rigged to the advantage of the Union Camerounaise that won the majority of seats. 
“s parliament was to elect the irst President, “hmadou “hidjo, being the only 
candidate, won. In his capacity as President of the Republic he could then look 
forward in implementing his hidden agenda.
The next stage was to unify all the political parties of the country into one. In 
September 1960, during the third ordinary congress of the Union Camerounaise, 
“hmadou “hidjo appealed for the building of a great national party. The irst move 
in that direction went towards the creation of the Mouvement d’Action Nationale du 
Cameroun that had only one parliamentarian in the National Assembly, Charles 
Assalé, whom Ahidjo appointed Prime Minister. By appointing him, Ahmadou 
Ahidjo was calling on that party and the regional association, the Union Tribal 
Bantou, which supported Assalé, to join the ranks of the Union Camerounaise. The 
new Premier, who controlled the Union Tribale Bantou, thought in vain that the 
merger of his party and his association could be obtained ater negotiations. That 
was not the President’s plan who preferred a merger without any negotiation, 
and in 1961 the MANC joined the ranks of the Union Camerounaise. Assalé resisted 
dissolving his association and as Ahidjo increased the pressure, and fearing the 
loss of his prime ministerial post, he convened a meeting of his association on 
September 8, 1962 in order to dissolve it (Kpwang, 1997, pp. 300-303). During the 
meeting, he called on his fellow members to join the Union Camerounaise. So, by 
will or by force, Cameroonians were to heed to the Maroua 1960 call for the build-
ing of the great national party which would be the single party. True to this logic, 
the UPC members were forced to join the Union Camerounaise as in 1962 their con-
gress was brutally dispersed by the police under the pretext that the party “had 
publicly bailed out the rebellion  Etangondop, , p.  ”ouopda, , pp. 
160-161). The suppression of the congress then compelled the members of the 
UPC to join the ranks of the Union Camerounaise. Some political parties such as the 
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Parti des Démocrates of André Marie Mbida tried to resist the suppression of mul-
tiparty politics but not for too long. Eventually, they were compelled to toe the 
line since, in the 1965 federal parliamentary elections, they were unable to consti-
tute a list of candidates. Their leaders understood that the parties lacked efective 
representation and decided to join the Union Camerounaise. In East Cameroon, 
everything was ready for the agenda to be completed. 
One of the tricks used by Ahidjo to implement his hidden agenda was to form, 
in conjunction with the KNDP of John Ngu Foncha, a “national united group” and 
a coordinating commitee in the Federal House of “ssembly. That was done ater 
reiterating of the call for the building of a great national party in November 1961. 
The appeal received a favourable welcome in West Cameroon. This was made 
possible by the internal problems that this federated state was experiencing. In 
the opinion of the KNDP, the opposition political party, the CNPC, was likely to 
dissolve and merge in the KNDP before the later party could negotiate the deal 
of building a great national party with Ahidjo and his UC. In doing so, the leader 
of the KNDP, Foncha, was to be Ahidjo’s sole interlocutor in negotiations for the 
great national party. The party experienced serious dissensions when John Ngu 
Foncha resigned his oice of Premier to become the vice-president of the Federal 
Republic of Cameroon. In fact, the legitimate ambitions of his lieutenants for his 
succession and his desire not to be cut of from his political basis generated some 
clashes which eventually led Solomon Tandeng Muna and Egbe Tabi to form 
the Cameroon United Congress (CUC . This let West Cameroon with three po-
litical parties. The actions of the CPNC and the CUC weakened the position of the 
KNDP and gave way to Ahidjo to stand as the referee of the game, maintaining his 
mastery of the situation. As West Cameroon politicians were dragging their feet 
on the path of the building of a great national party, Ahidjo became impatient. 
On June 11, 1965, he convened the Premiers of the two federated states and the 
leaders of the three West Cameroonian political parties in Yaoundé and drove 
home the necessity of a single party for the proper functioning of the Federation 
Etangondop, , p. . He succeeded in convincing them and they put up a 
commitee in charge of elaborating the structures of the single party. Progressively, 
political parties of West Cameroon were dissolved and on September 1, 1966, 
the Cameroon National Union, the single party, was created. Ahidjo’s dream had 
come true.
Cameroon was not the only African country that engaged in the single-party 
political system, given that it was a notable trend in “frica ater independence. 
Virtually all African states established the one party system using the arguments 
presented by Peter Wanyande (2000, pp. 108-109). Firstly, African rulers said that 
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multiparty system was foreign to Africa and of Western origin. Secondly, they 
argued that Africa, being underdeveloped, needed to concentrate on her eco-
nomic development that needed the energy of all the citizens in one country3. 
Multiparty politics was not conducive to such development, and would rather 
divide the energies of the populations without any positive efects. That is why, 
in Niger, the one party system was established at independence with the Parti 
Progressiste Nigérien (PPN) as the national wing of the Rassemblement Démocratique 
Africain (RDA) dominating until 1974 when Seyni Kountché overthrew Hamani 
Diori (Grémah, 1999; Raynaut & Abba, 1990, p. 16). The existence of the single 
party was embedded in the constitution that Kountché suspended and ruled 
without political party till his death in 1987. Ali Saïbou took over and put in place 
the , the Mouvement National pour la Société de Développement (MNSD), which oper-
ated as the single party in accordance with the constitution he put in place with-
in two years ater taking power. When ”enin acceded to independence Hubert 
Maga established the single party system that lasted only for three years. In 1963, 
a putsch ousted him and, since then, the country was plagued by instability that 
culminated in 1972 with the coming to power of Mathieu Kérékou who, again, 
institutionalised the one party system with the Parti de la Révolution Populaire du 
Bénin (PRPB) (Magnusson, 1996, p. 33). Like in Niger, this political system was 
embedded in the constitutions put in place by Maga and Kérékou respectively. 
Therein lies the diference with the system in Cameroon given that the estab-
lishment of the single party politics in Cameroon in 1966 was not preceded nor 
followed by any constitutional amendment. The 1961 federal constitutional still 
provided in his article 3 what follows:
The political parties and groups play a part in the expression of the sufrage. They 
shall be free to form and to carry on their activities within the limits established by 
law and regulations.
They must respect the principles of democracy and national sovereignty 
(Enonchong, 1967, p. 255).
This option seemed not to contradict the will of Ahmadou Ahidjo who was 
a militant of democracy but his own democracy, that is the ‘ruling democracy’ 
he wanted for Cameroon. The argument for this brand of democracy does not 
difer from the ideas that were put forward elsewhere in “frica in order to jus-
tify the single party system. African or Cameroonian democracy should not be a 
mere imitation of what is enforced in the West. In the words of Ahmadou Ahidjo, 
3 Peter Wayande, the author, does not share these arguments developed by African political leaders, but rather 
opposes them as he demonstrated their fallacy in his contribution quoted here.
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“freely, and in sovereign fashion, we have chosen democracy; but the democratic 
systems of the West and Eastern Europe are not products that can directly be 
exported to African countries” (Cameroon National Union, 1976, p. 43). The ‘rul-
ing democracy’ needs unity which enables stability and the rule of an individual 
through the single party that is accepted by all in a Presidential regime as Ahidjo 
himself asserted.
Our Presidential regime represents a double advantage for the State. First of all, it 
allows the Head of State to stand as a symbol of unity for an emerging nation.
In second place, it allows the executive to play its full role as the driving force 
for national development in conformity with the national constitution which pro-
vides for both the separation and the collaboration of powers in a spirit of com-
plementarity, as required of the whole civil service by its adhesion to one single 
party.
It is in consideration of the later point that we have described our political 
system as a ‘ruling democracy’, in contrast to the regimes where the executive is 
constantly paralysed by rits of popular opion [sic opinions] power struggles and 
conlicts of individual interests Cameroon National Union, , pp. - . 
In the system of ‘ruling democracy’ there is no competition, but a single party 
that dominates. The party is the , which dominates all other institutions in the 
country. The country’s institutions are used to promote the party that serves the 
interest of those who control both the party and the state. It means therefore that 
the  is out to promote the interests of the rulers which are opposed to national 
interests. As Peter Wanyande (2000, p. 113) observed, in such a system, the gap 
between the rulers and the ruled has led those who control state power to be 
repressive and less responsive to the wishes of the society which are not taken in 
consideration. The rulers instead use the various institutions, which are normally 
designed to promote national interest, as tools for the promotion of their paro-
chial interests. From 1966 to 1990, that is what Cameroonians got from the ‘ruling 
democracy’: i.e. the domination of the  almost enslaved the country’s citizens in 
the interest of the party and its leaders.
The second phase of the search for the Cameroonian model 
of democracy or the building of the ‘advanced democracy’
This phase of the search for the Cameroonian model of democracy is char-
acterised by the resistance to the multiparty politics and the implementation of 
what has been termed ‘advanced democracy’, as result of mounting pressure. 
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The ‘advanced democracy’ is summed up as a democracy of the domination of 
the former .
The advent of multiparty democracy in Africa
In the 1980s, Africa was stricken by a severe economic crisis which resulted 
in the bankruptcy of nearly all the countries of the continent, which as a result 
had to resort to the ”reton Woods institutions. The general remedy prepared 
for bankrupt African countries is the implementation of a structural adjustment 
plan. The acceptance of this structural adjustment plan is a condition any bilat-
eral inancial assistance. This adjustment plan is composed of harsh economic 
measures which can produce tensions and popular dissatisfaction. Facing this 
complex situation, “frican leaders were called upon to advance with puting in 
place democratic institutions before aspiring for inancial support. That is what 
François Miterrand stated in his opening speech during the France “frica sum-
mit that took place in La Baule in June 1990. He said that France would continue 
to help African countries but that assistance would be “half-hearted” for coun-
tries with authoritarian regimes and would be “wholehearted” for countries that 
would, with courage, embark on democratisation (Hugues, 2007). 
The advent of multiparty democracy in Benin and Niger
”enin was the irst “frican country to be swept by democracy s third wave . 
It is in this country that the maiden sovereign national conference was organised 
as from February 19, 1990. Robert Dossou (2000) has given a good account of the 
preparation, the sessions and the result of the Beninese national conference that 
ended on February , . From this account, one learns many things. The irst 
is that, facing a di cult situation, the ”eninese leaders decided to meet and initi-
ate a dialogue before inding adequate solutions. Hence, the national conference 
framed the trajectory for democratisation. This forum set up new institutions 
which were transitory: the President was stripped of some of his former powers 
that went to the transitional Premier and the former National Assembly was re-
placed by the Haut Conseil de la République, the members of which were elected by 
the national conference. The transition period was to last one year, from March 
1, 1990 to March 1, 1991. During this period, the transitional institutions were to 
implement the decisions taken by the national conference, notably the drating 
of the constitution by the commitee appointed by the conference, the organisa-
tion of the constitutional referendum and the holding of various elections. On 
April 1, 1991, the new date set for the end of the transitional period as provided 
by the new constitution of December 1990, the process had been completed. The 
new seting in ”enin was the result of a confabulation and not the decision of an 
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individual. The new institutions have worked well, experiencing political alter-
nation, which is a fundamental principle of democracy. There have been some 
improvements, notably the creation, in 1995, of an independent body for the or-
ganisation of elections. That novelty came about as a result of the dialogue and 
consensus which forms the corner stone of the new political seting in ”enin. The 
Beninese experience has been depicted as a success story, which is why it has 
been imitated in some African countries like Chad, Gabon, Congo and Niger. 
The President of Niger acknowledged its success and praised the Beninese for 
that undertaking in one of the opening speeches of the conference that took place 
in February 2000 in Cotonou to draw up a balance of national conferences and 
democratic transitions. That is why the citizens of Niger claimed the organisation 
of such a conference in their country in 1991.
In Niger, the sovereign national conference opened on July 29, 1991 and lasted 
for ninety eight days. It should be recalled that, when the citizens of that country 
started their claim for democratisation, the ruling  opposed to change. The irst 
step in the resistance was the appointment of Mahamadou Halilou as the media-
tor whose duty was to improve relations between the state on the one hand and 
the trade unions and students on the other (Salifou, 2000). The second step of the 
party’s resistance resided in the move of the Head of State to alone decide on the 
advent of multiparty politics in Niger. “s a mater of fact, facing mounting pres-
sure, Ali Saïbou, on November 15, 1990, announced, during a meeting of what 
was then the steering commitee of the single party, that he had opted for multi-
party politics. On December 4, 1990, he added that nascent political parties could 
apply for temporary authorization before the revision of the constitution ena-
bling their legalization. These delaying tactics did not satisfy the demands of the 
protesters who intensiied their actions that inally compelled the rulers in Niger 
to comply with the demand for the convening of a national conference. As in 
Benin, the national conference of Niger drew up a balance of the past while pro-
posing new perspectives for the country’s future. Transitional institutions were 
set up for 15 months, including the Head of State whose powers were reduced in 
favour of the transitional Prime Minister appointed by the conference, Chefou 
Amadou. A transitional parliament was established called the Haut Conseil de la 
République. The national conference adopted a charter for political parties and 
appointed a commitee for the drating of the new constitution. The experience of 
Niger, mutatis mutandis, is also considered to be a success story. This may sound 
like an overstatement given that one can ask the question as to why the process 
was interrupted by military coups. Of course Niger witnessed two coups, one of 
which was a bloody one. As the arguments put forward by Mamoudou Gazibo 
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(2000) provide an explanation fort the case of Benin which received what has 
been called a “premium for democracy” that helped the country to solve most of 
its inancial di culties, thus pre-empting actions like those witnessed in Niger. 
That was not the case for the later country. Here, the national conference had 
nearly rejected the agreement with the ”reton Woods institutions without pro-
posing any credible alternative. The inancial di culties of the country worsened 
and paralysed the actions of the government. As the constitution of Niger opted 
for the semi-presidential regime, the path was opened for instability, since po-
litical leaders self-interest caused them to defend those rather identifying with 
Niger’s national interests. The institutions came to be paralysed because their 
leaders were competing for control and gain advantages as the new situation de-
veloped. The institutional paralysis had a boomerang efect as the army took the 
opportunity to intervene, reacting to the humiliation it sufered during and ater 
the national conference. The Nigeriens did not know that, in a country where 
the army had been part and parcel of its national institutions, they were not to 
receive any harsh treatment. Instead they had to be cajoled and, by so doing, they 
could go back to their barracks and stay there without any temptation of return-
ing to power. The Nigeriens learnt a good lesson from that sad experience. They 
applied it in 2000 when they decided to grant amnesty to the authors of the 1996 
and 1999 coups. The return to civilian rule through elections in 2000 resulted 
mainly from the spirit of dialogue and consensus established during the national 
conference, which in the case of Niger, can be considered an important asset. It is 
only the beginning of Niger’s experience that can be likened to that of Cameroon, 
as this country resisted the advent of the multiparty system.
The advent of multiparty democracy in Cameroon
In 1982, Ahmadou Ahidjo resigned as Head of State and, as provided by the 
constitution, Paul Biya succeeded to the helm of Cameroon. The new President, 
on taking the oath of oice declared that there would be continuity. It meant 
that he would continue with the ‘ruling democracy’. His predecessor had long 
remained at the helm of the single party. As it was a  whose chairman was also 
Head of State, the confusion between the party and the state caused problems to 
arise. Cameroon was in a situation of political duality that generated the problem 
of pre-eminence between the party and the state. As long as one individual was 
the Head of State and the chairman of the party, this problem would not arise. 
That not being the case anymore, the holder of either position could obviously 
interpret the situation in his favour. The situation degenerated and soon an open 
crisis arose when the 1983 coup was nipped in the bud and a coup aborted in the 
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following year. Consequently, Ahmadou Ahidjo resigned from the chairmanship 
of the party. Paul Biya replaced him, then accumulating the two positions, which 
signiied a return to the situation as it existed before . In his new position, he 
transformed the CNU into the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) 
that became the state party. Apparently, the new party and its leaders had a fore-
sight as to the advent of multiparty politics and anticipated measures in order 
to resist it. The irst measure came into force in  during the renewal of the 
basic institutions of the ruling party that witnessed a plurality of candidates’ lists 
(Sindjoun, 1997, p. 97). In 1987, for the town council elections, the experience 
was renewed, and likewise in 1988 for the parliamentary elections. It is worth 
mentioning here that the experience began in November 1983. The electoral law 
governing the presidential election was amended, giving room for a plurality 
of candidates  indeed, the context called for such a move  ater the  aborted 
coup, Biya was in search of legitimacy. In the CNU, only the party could put a 
candidate up for election, but as the chairman of the party, he was not prepared 
to allow the candidacies of challengers. For the parliamentary and town council 
elections, the competition was within the single party. This overture was in fact a 
smoke screen aimed at showing that the political process was actually democrat-
ic in the country. It was an anticipated resistance to the advent of the multiparty 
system in Cameroon. The argument was used in  when the irst atempts for 
the creation of new political parties were made.
In the irst quarter of , Yondo Mandengué ”lack, “lbert Mukong, “nicet 
Ekanet and others were arrested in Douala, allegedly for having held illegal meet-
ings and for having distributed tracts hostile to the Head of State and calling for 
violence (Ngniman, 1993, p. 46; Sindjoun, 1999, p. 86). However, the real reasons 
given for the arrest were that the arrested persons wanted to form a political par-
ty. The move was illegal as there was a de facto single party system in Cameroon. 
These Cameroonians were tried before the military court so as to give credit to the 
oicial version of their arrest, and were sentenced to minor imprisonment terms. 
The show of force was designed to dissuade anybody to embark upon a move 
towards creating a political party and to challenge the state party with a view 
to bring about a multiparty system in Cameroon. And in order to drive home 
the message, marches were organized by the one-party-state in the main cities 
of the country to protest against multiparty system and in support of the single 
party system. “ mass to that efect was also celebrated in the Yaoundé cathedral 
bringing together Catholics, Protestants and even Moslems. The show of force 
was again staged on May 26, 1990, during the launching of the Social Democratic 
Front (SDF) in Bamenda. It resulted in the killing of six Cameroonians. In the 
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meantime, external pressure was growing and the speech of François Miterrand 
at La Baule seems to have been the last stroke that broke the camel’s back.
From resistance to the ‘advanced democracy’
“lthough the single state party inally yielded to pressures coming from with-
in and from society at large and accepted the multiparty democracy, it tailored 
that democracy to suit the will of the rulers in the following terms: as multiparty 
politics has been forced upon the country, the new system should be that of the 
domination of the ruling party. This domination would be carried out through 
adapted laws and bodies.
“ter the La ”aule summit, the irst ordinary congress of the CPDM opened in 
Yaoundé on June 28, 1990. During the congress, the chairman of the party asked 
his fellow comrades to prepare for “possible competition”. The words used por-
trayed some hesitation which was another sign of resistance, without giving any 
assurance to the path to be followed. Reducing it to a possibility meant that, in 
the mind of the chairman of the CPDM, who doubled as Head of State, there was 
still hope that the advent of multiparty system in Cameroon could be pre-empt-
ed. Eventually, that was not the case and in December 1990, the single state party 
passed several laws, notably the law governing political parties. It is on the basis 
of this law that the irst political parties were legalized in February . Most of 
the political parties newly born claimed to be opposition parties. They immedi-
ately organized into a coalition of opposition parties and called for the conven-
ing of a sovereign national conference in order to assess the general state of the 
nation and deine major political, economic, social and cultural guidelines for the 
future. In reality, knowing what had been the outcome of the national conference 
in Benin, they nursed the idea of obtaining a share of political power. The ruling 
CPDM also knew what had happened in that country and was not willing to share 
power or to have a Head of State stripped of some of his powers. Moreover, in 
the ‘advanced democracy’ the CPDM regime had started puting in place, the state 
party was to single-handedly decide everything. There was no room for dialogue 
and consensus.
The opposition mounted pressure on the government by organizing a coun-
try-wide civil disobedience campaign and Ghost Towns operations which were 
marked by acts of violence and vandalism (Mbu, 1993, pp. 44-81; Ngniman, 1993, 
pp. 88-95). In reaction, the government took tough measures such as the creation 
of operational commands in the provinces that had heeded the opposition call. 
The country recorded many casualties as a result of the interventions of these 
operational commands. In the meantime, the economy was in decline and state 
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authority weakened in the process. In order to avoid a downward spiral and 
stand irm, the ruling CPDM government conjured a trick to wrong foot the oppo-
sition. Instead of convening a national conference, Paul Biya convened a tripar-
tite conference with the government, political parties and neutral personalities. 
Eboussi-Boulaga observed (1997, pp. 94-95) that most of the so called independ-
ent personalities were members of the ruling CPDM who were in cahoots with the 
representatives of the government. As a result, the forum that took place from 
October 30 to November 15, 1991 was dominated by the former state party. Its 
two-item agenda was to put in place mixed commitees in charge of drating 
the electoral law and a project governing the access of political parties to public 
media. From the composition of the forum which was presided over by the then 
Premier Sadou Hayatou, nothing revolutionary could be expected. The ruse was 
successful as, at the end of the tripartite conference, the Yaoundé Declaration was 
signed by participants and the representatives of 40 of the 47 legalized political 
parties Ngniman, , pp. - . The government lited the ban on public 
meetings and demonstrations as well as dissolving the operational commands. 
The political parties, especially the opposition, agreed to withdraw the call for 
civil disobedience and to respect the laws and regulations regarding their activi-
ties. The signatories of the Yaoundé Declaration also agreed to put in place a tri-
partite technical commitee in order to drat proposals relating to constitutional 
reform. As the political tension was eased in the country, the government could 
go ahead with its agenda, including one important item which was the holding 
of parliamentary elections. A law was needed to govern the elections and it was 
incumbent on the CPDM parliament to pass that law and other proposals, notably 
the law governing presidential elections.
Legislating in favour of the former state party
The last session of the single state party parliament which was held in 1991, 
proved to be of great importance with regard to Cameroon’s future political land-
scape. It was supposed to lay the foundations for the ‘advanced democracy’ en-
visaged by the single party government.
The irst drat bill voted upon was the one governing the election of parliamen-
tarians. During the debate, the idea of enfranchising Cameroonians from nine-
teen years of age old was put forward and portrayed as the general opinion and 
call from the nation. The idea was rejected and the age of twenty was proposed 
as a threshold in the drat bill. In justifying their choice, the parliamentarians 
argued that the recent experience had shown that youths were not very respon-
sible persons since they were at the forefront of civil disobedience and violence. 
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The truth is that parliament feared the sanction of the youth vote. This group had 
been severely afected by the economic crisis and unemployment and was very 
disgruntled at the time. Enfranchising too many of them was regarded as a risk 
of giving votes to the opposition that could as a result end up dominating the 
political landscape. For the CPDM to dominate, it would be preferable to enfran-
chise only part of this group of potential voters. The law that was inally passed 
by the parliament allowed for gerrymandering and vote rigging. Article 3 of that 
law promulgated on December 16, 1991, provided that the constituency was the 
main electoral division. But some constituencies could be specially carved out 
given their particular situation. In the 1992 snap parliamentary elections, there 
was no special constituency. The ruling CPDM did not win any seat in the North 
West province, the stronghold of the SDF. In the 1997 parliamentary elections, Bali 
Kumbat was carved out of the Ngo-Ketunja Division as a special constituency. 
There, the CPDM candidate was the Fon of Bali Kumbat who used his traditional 
inluence to win the seat, thereby giving the CPDM one sole parliamentarian in 
the whole North-West province. Hence, the CPDM claimed to be the only national 
political party as it had a parliamentarian in all the provinces contrary to other 
political parties that were merely regional organisations. For the upcoming twin 
elections, the Head of State, who is also chairman of the CPDM, once more resort-
ed to gerrymandering. This time round, he undermined the bastions of all op-
position parties. In the North-West province, the stronghold of the SDF, Mezam, 
Donga-Mantung, Momo and Menchum divisions were divided into at least two 
constituencies each. The Magba special constituency, with one seat, was carved 
out from the Noun division, a stronghold of the Cameroon Democratic Union 
(CDU  that had won the ive seats since . From all indications Magba seemed 
to be a stronghold of the CPDM in the Noun division. The oicial explanation 
given to this carving up of divisions is that it was a way of approximating rulers 
and ruled. In order to reinforce this argument, it was said that even the bastions 
of the CPDM had been ‘carved out’. The true story is that the regime wanted to cre-
ate favourable conditions for the ruling party. The law governing parliamentary 
elections established in articles 5 and 6 that elections were to be carried out ac-
cording to the ballot lists; the list that obtained the absolute majority wins all the 
constituency seats. In case the winning list had a relative majority, half the seats 
were allocated to it, while the rest of seats were to be distributed proportionally 
to the other lists. The special constituencies were created on the basis of the re-
sults the CPDM obtained in past elections. It was expected that the trend would 
be similar so that the ruling party would have a majority of the seats in the new 
divisions. The argument of bringing the administration closer to the ruled can 
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therefore be easily be rejected  ater all the carving out of novel constituencies in 
CPDM bastions was a means of healing wounds provoked by the recent renewal 
of basic organs of the ruling party. The new town councils had been created with 
the same intentions.
For the town council elections, new councils were created on April 22, 2007, 
two days ater the convening of the electorate, a move which amounted to glaring 
foul play, given that this should normally be done before the calling of elections. 
It was not the irst time that the regime used these foul tricks in favour of the 
ruling party. In 1997, the town council elections were won in Bamenda, Limbe, 
Kumba Bafoussam and Garoua by the opposition; subsequently, the Head of 
State appointed CPDM oicials at the helm of these councils, thereby transform-
ing the likely defeat of his party into a victory (Ngoh, 2001, p. 34).
In the 1992 snap parliamentary elections, the CPDM failed to win the abso-
lute majority of the 180 seats which would have enabled it to rule without allies. 
An alliance was concluded with the Mouvement Démocratique pour la Défense de 
la République (MDR), and was later extended to the UPC and the National Union 
for Democracy and Progress (NUDP). In the alliance, the three political parties 
contributed to legislating in favour of the former state party, but in the proc-
ess, they also defended their own interests. An illustration can be given with the 
September 1992 extraordinary session of the parliament convened in order to vote 
the law governing presidential election. The drat bill submited provided for a 
one round, single candidate ballot. Moreover, the president, who enjoyed a ive 
year term, was re-eligible and the candidates should have resided in Cameroon 
for the three years preceding the election Ngniman, , p. . The inal bill 
voted by the parliament changed the residency clause, and was the outcome of 
negotiations with the NUDP that was up for a two round election. Since its chair-
man, Bello Bouba Maigari intended to be his party’s candidate and had resided 
in Cameroon only for the past thirteen months, the drat disqualiied him. So, the 
deal with CPDM stated that the residency clause be reduced from three years to 
one year and that the one round ballot system should be maintained (Sindjoun, 
1997, p. 100). The same bill provided that a candidate could not be invested by 
more than one party. This clause was aimed at preventing a unique opposition 
candidate and therefore worked in favour of the ruling CPDM. In the snap presi-
dential election that took place on October 1992, Biya won with 39.97% as against 
. % for Ni John Fru Ndi. The later blamed his defeat on electoral rigging, an 
accusation which was once more directed at the single party in 1997 when the 
CPDM won the parliamentary elections with 116 out of 180 seats. Therefore, the 
opposition launched its claim for the creation of an independent electoral body 
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to manage the elections in Cameroon for the sake of transparency. The boycot by 
the SDF and the CDU of the 1997 presidential elections was precisely based upon 
the refusal of the government to put in place such a body that was in existence in 
countries like Benin. The government’s refusal was on the grounds that it did not 
want imported models. But in the end it yielded to mounting pressures, but in 
puting in place the body in question, it again made sure that it would not work 
against the ruling party.
In 2000, parliament voted the bill creating a body in charge of supervising 
elections in Cameroon, i.e. the National Elections Observatory, beter known by 
its French acronym, ONEL. The later was imported from Senegal where it had 
been created in 1997. How is it that those who opposed imported models should 
suddenly import one? The answer can only be found in the intention of the rul-
ers to legislate in favour of the continued dominance of the ruling party. If the 
government did import a model, it was supposed to harmless to the ruling party. 
That then, can only be understood in the light of the context in which the ONEL 
was presented by Zekeria Ould Ahmed Salem (2000). In Senegal, the ONEL was 
accepted by Abdou Diouf and his political party only as a means of pre-empting 
the creation of the independent body that was claimed by the opposition. The 
independent body called for was to take care of the whole electoral process from 
the registration on electoral rolls to the proclamation of the results. It seemed to 
be disadvantageous to the ruling party to refuse such a model. As the opposition 
insisted, the government inally yielded to demands by appointing a commitee 
made up of independent personalities and experts that was in charge of presid-
ing over discussions grouping all the political parties of Senegal. It is on the basis 
of the work done by this commitee that “bdou Diouf created ONEL, the role of 
which was merely to supervise and control elections, as ONEL had no efective 
power. Surprisingly, thanks to the commitment of its members to democracy and 
neutrality, ONEL eventually produced spectacular results, and decisively contrib-
uted to the 2000 alternation in Senegal.
The Cameroonian ONEL was also divested of power, and only meant to super-
vise and control elections. But ONEL in Cameroon was not created on the basis of 
discussions between political parties: it was a single-handed creation of the gov-
ernment with the blessings of the CPDM dominated parliament. The Cameroonian 
ONEL members could not be credited with impartiality. Its irst president, Enoch 
Kwayeb, was a CPDM member. What could one expect as far as political neutrality 
was concerned from such a president? As ONEL had no credit and the opposition 
still claimed a real independent body, the government, still under pressure, opted 
for the creation of Elections Cameroon (ELECAM . The drat bill for ELECAM gave 
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the impression that it was a really independent body as it has the task of organis-
ing, managing and supervising the whole electoral process in Cameroon. But as 
elections approached in Cameroon, the government laid down in article 42 of the 
drat that before the creating ONEL, the administration would continue to organ-
ise elections. The clause was understood as a procrastinating measure illustrating 
the will of the government not to accept an independent body for the manage-
ment of elections. Since the CPDM enjoyed the majority in the parliament, nothing 
could counter the voting of the bill. Facing the protestation of the opposition that 
staged a walk out, the government changed the clause by allowing a period of 
18 months for the establishment of ELECAM. As elections had been convened for 
July 22, 2007, the administration would again work in favour of the ruling party, 
illustrating the workings of the ‘advanced democracy’ on the move.
Conclusion
All in all, Cameroon, since independence, has been searching for its own 
model of democracy. That democracy was to be its own brand and not an im-
ported model. The irst stage was the institution of the ruling democracy . This 
Cameroonian brand was characterized by the establishment of the single party 
system designed to assure the domination of a handful of individuals through 
the sole political party that identiied itself with the state. The one-party system 
was ater all the general model for “frica. ”ut in comparison with ”enin and 
Niger, Cameroon had a particular model of its own. The Cameroonian exception 
lay in the fact that the system was a de facto one party system as the constitution 
still provided for multiparty politics, but not a de jure one. In the 1990s, Cameroon 
was forced into the multiparty system. As the rulers did not want the new system, 
they instituted the ‘advanced democracy’ that aimed at insuring the domination 
of the ruling party which was the former state party. All legislation regarding the 
political system has adhered to that spirit. In comparison with Benin and Niger, 
the striking diference lies in the absence of dialogue in Cameroon. Whereas in 
these countries political change was carried out through dialogue, in Cameroon 
the government shied away from dialogue, preferring to dictate. That circum-
stance largely accounts for the absence of alternation at the helm of the state. The 
‘advanced democracy’ that succeeded the ‘ruling democracy’ model seems to dif-
fer litle from the former since it is still based upon the domination of the political 
scene by a single party. On the face of it, the ‘advanced democracy’ seems to be 
equivalent to the multiparty system, but in reality is far from a truly democratic 
system when assessed on the basis of the criteria for democracy listed by Peter 
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Wanyande. The prospect for the near future is that ELECAM should constitute 
a guarantee for freedom, transparency and fairness of elections. Consequently, 
there can be hope for alternation and for subsequent real dialogue much needed 
by democracy.
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